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IN REPLY REFER TO:

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From: Commander in Chief, U. S. Naval Forces,
Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean
To: Chief of Naval Operations (Director of Naval Intelligence)
Subj: National Intelligence Studies of Middle East Areas; comments
on the adequacy of (G)

Ref: (a) CMO ltr Op922H2F ser 027633P92 of 25 Nov 1958

1. In reference (a) the Chief of Naval Operations requested that comments on the adequacy of National Intelligence Studies (NIS) of the Middle East, based upon experiences of this command during the operations in Lebanon, be forwarded to CMO (DNI) for presentation to the NIS Committee.

2. In addition to the immediate experience of elements of the CINCPACFLT and CINCSPECOMM Staffs, comments have been requested or invited by CINCPACFLT from the following commands which were also involved in Middle East planning and operations:

US CINCPACFLT
CINCUSARPAC
CINCUSAFE

COMSIXTHFLT
COMFAIRCOM
COMTSSELM

FLINTCINCPACFLT

In addition COMSIXTHFLT in turn solicited comments from CTF 61 (COMPHIBRON 6) and CTF 62. The ensuing report incorporates and combines the comments submitted by all of the aforementioned commands. Specific attribution is made where considered applicable.

3. Extent of Use of the NIS. The NIS is widely used by all the military commands mentioned in paragraph 2 above. Selected comments on this use are as follows:

This Headquarters made extensive use of the NIS in preparation of USAF OPLAN 100-58, Operation POSTCARD, in support of CINCSPECOMM OPLAN 215-58. (CINCUSAFE)

During the Middle East crisis, sections of the NIS for Lebanon, Syria, Israel, and Egypt were used in the preparation of oral and written briefs and country studies. (FLINTCINCPACFLT)

The NIS is used by COMFAIRCOM primarily for background information and as a reference in the preparation of Intelligence annexes to Operations Plans and Operation Orders. (COMFAIRCOM)

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NIS publications constitute the most important single source of both general and specific information on Middle East and Mediterranean countries. During the mid-1958 crisis in Lebanon, NIS coverage on Lebanon, Syria, and other Mideast countries was extremely valuable in planning and executing landing operations, and in the preparation of briefings, estimates, and special studies. (COMSIXTHFLT)

For the type planning conducted by this Force, NIS offer excellent bases for complete planning of unopposed landings and initial planning of opposed landings. (CTF 62)

4. General Comments.

a. By far the most common complaint found by users of the NIS has been the lack of adequate maintenance. USCINCEUR comments that the NIS is "inadequate on the majority of Middle East countries due to outdated publications." CINCUSAREUR says the NIS is "largely inadequate due to obsolescence." FLEINTCENEIM, perhaps, sums up the general feeling best in the following comment:

Usually NIS materials were supplemented by more current information held by the command. NIS were rarely used as the primary source for data which the urgency of the Middle East situation demanded. In relatively immutable categories, NIS Sections published within the last 3-5 years were found to be wholly adequate and especially useful. The impact of time on the content of NIS is accentuated for the Middle East areas because of the rapid and far reaching changes which have occurred during the last decade.

b. CINCNEIM and CINCSPCOMME experience reinforces these comments on the lack of adequate maintenance to up-date information in the NIS once published. For the specific countries for which CINCSPCOMME was and is actively engaged in producing and maintaining active contingency plans under the directives of the JCS, the following table gives a limited but vivid demonstration of this inadequacy:

Per cent of Sections and Supplements (less Chapter I) which are published and available which are:

<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>More than 5 years old</u>	<u>More than 8 years old</u>
SYRIA	74%	32%
LEBANON	74%	32%
JORDAN	50%	21%

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<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>More than 5 years old</u>	<u>More than 8 years old</u>
IRAQ	83%	53%
ISRAEL	31%	28%
ARABIAN PENINSULA	43%	41%
IRAN	74%	49%
EGYPT	59%	46%
SUDAN	100%	43%

It is recognized that such a tabulation cannot stand any rigorous examination because of the variables involved. Certain Sections are still quite useful even when five years old, while others lose a great deal of value after only two or three years. But generally this shows that an unacceptable amount of basic strategic intelligence available to senior military commanders is not sufficiently current. (Detailed comments on the relative inadequacies of specific portions of the NIS will be found in a later section of this letter).

c. Suggestions and recommendations for overcoming this major deficiency have been advanced by several commands. FLEINTCENKLM recommends that, to achieve maximum utility, NIS material should be maintained and up-dated at intervals not to exceed a five year period. CINCUSAREUR says, "Because of continuing US interest and military importance Middle East and North African areas, recommend high priority be given revision pertinent chapters NIS." USCINCEUR suggests that the NIS would "better serve purpose if loose-leaf revisions issued on timely basis, particularly for those chapters and sections covering subjects given to continual change."

d. CINCNELM concurs, and especially endorses the requirement for a loose-leaf format which would permit more rapid promulgation of revised pages and sections of the NIS. Complete revision of a bulky Section is recognized as a major undertaking, but under the current system intelligence is stored up in files in Washington which should be flowing regularly out into the basic reference work of the intelligence community in the form of periodic changes, and a loose-leaf approach would permit this to be done.

e. Again, since the NIS program is not yet completed on a "first time around" basis for the entire world, it is recognized that the maintenance program must conflict with original production, since both involve the same personnel in the Washington intelligence agencies. Yet it would appear that closer attention is required as to the relative priorities of original

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production versus increased maintenance. To give an example in concrete terms (though it may represent an extreme case): During 1958 it is known that ONI was engaged on NIS work that involved a study of the coasts and landing beaches of Southern Australia. This was original work that had never yet been published in the NIS. But it would certainly appear that, gearing production to known current war plans and the military requirements of the United States for the next few years, this available production effort could be better applied in revising and up-dating the already existing NIS Coast and Landing Beach Sections for SYRIA, LEBANON, ISRAEL, and the ARABIAN PENINSULA, all of which are ten years old and subject to all the doubts and inaccuracies that this age implies.

5. Specific Comments:

a. Chapter I (Brief): This is perhaps one of the most used portions of the NIS, comprising, as it does, a summary of intelligence on the country. US CINCEUR comments that the Brief on MOROCCO dated March 1958 to up-date Chapter I has been helpful, and that annual maintenance for Chapter I, similar to that for SWEDEN dated 1 November 1958, would be most helpful for his planning purposes. FLEINTCENELM recommends, similarly, that Chapter I should be revised for each NIS volume, at least through a page change method, whenever a major change in the structure of the government or a major reorientation of national policies occurs. From the CINCELM/CINCSPECOMME view, lack of publication to date of Chapter I's for NIS 31 (ISRAEL), NIS 32 (ARABIAN PENINSULA), and NIS 54 (SUDAN) is particularly a handicap in developing plans under JCS directives, while Chapter I is not yet published and most desirable for the following NIS' in the SPECOMME area:

NIS 34 - AFGHANISTAN

NIS 37 - CEYLON

NIS 55 - ETHIOPIA, ERITREA, and the SOMALILANDS

Existing Chapter I's on TURKEY, SYRIA, LEBANON, JORDAN, IRAQ, IRAN, PAKISTAN, INDIA, and EGYPT are all of great value, and it is gratifying to note that these have all been published recently, the oldest being that for IRAN published in January 1954.

b. Section 22 (Coasts and Landing Beaches): For NIS 28-31 and NIS 33 this section is already 10 years old. Since the countries involved (SYRIA, LEBANON, ISRAEL, and the ARABIAN PENINSULA) are high on the list of probable U. S. operating areas under CINCSPECOMME plans, and amphibious operations are generally involved, this represents a distinct shortcoming. A general description of the use of this Section is provided by the following comment from CTF 61:

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The NIS are excellent aids in the initial phases of any landing. However, greater detail on the specific landing area must be obtained and disseminated before any landing can be conducted. Detailed charts and maps of a scale approximately 1:25,000 and specific hydrographic information inside the 3-fathom curve are required. For example: By use of the NIS the landing sites for ZUARA (Libya) and GREENSWING (Italy) were closely selected. This allowed precise direction of the UDU effort. The UDU survey at ZUARA discovered an unreported ledge which prevents normal beaching of LST. This would severely hamper a combat assault. No such obstacle was found at the GREENSWING landing site, and the landing could have been conducted from the information contained in NIS.

c. Section 23 (Weather and Climate): For SYRIA, LEBANON, JORDAN, ISRAEL, SUDAN, and the ARABIAN PENINSULA this Section is 10 years old and in need of up-dating. While weather and climate are perhaps the least changing aspects of an area of the world, the mere accumulation of additional data between 1949 and 1959 should permit a more useful and meaningful product than the one currently available in these cases.

d. Section 24 (Topography): CINCUSAREUR comments that this Section should have particular attention as it pertains to airborne operations. A discussion and a map of drop zones, neither of which is currently included, would be particularly desirable. Otherwise commands are agreed that this Section is generally adequate, although the remarks under Section 23 apply here as well.

e. Section 25 (Urban Areas): This Section is already 10 years old for the countries of SYRIA, LEBANON, JORDAN, SUDAN, and the ARABIAN PENINSULA, and urban areas are subject to considerable change in the fast developing Middle East. (See also comments under Supplement IV below).

f. Chapter III (Transportation and Telecommunications): While CINCUSAFE reports this Chapter of the Middle East NIS was used and found to be adequate in detail and scope, CINCUSAREUR comments that the Communications portions are particularly obsolescent and CINCOSPECOM's staff experience in LEBANON confirms this comment. Section 38 of the NIS on LEBANON is ten years old.

g. Chapter IV (Sociological): While adequate in most respects, the Chapter IV material of the NIS for the Middle East countries is either obsolescent or incomplete in the following categories:

- (1) Minority political groups and movements
- (2) Contemporary social and psychological forces influencing the people and the government

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For example, detailed information on the attitudes, values, and objectives of dissident groups such as the Druze who played a significant role in the Lebanese crisis was found lacking in the NIS. Because the countries of the Middle East are particularly vulnerable to sociological influences, special attention should be given to this chapter and the treatment of the subject should emphasize the areas of vulnerability. Similar comment from the FLEINTCENELM was as follows:

Although this command was aware of the impending troubles in LEBANON, and had amassed a considerable amount of background material, the NIS was used as the last-resort reference for intelligence not available in other source materials. Requirements for information concerning the nature and composition of quasi-military groups among the rebels, the general character of the Lebanese society at the time, subversive potentialities, and related subjects were not adequately covered by the NIS. Department of the Army's "Special Warfare Area Handbook for Lebanon," prepared by Human Relations Area Files, provided one of the most valuable reference works for the type of information listed. It is appreciated that NIS cannot provide encyclopedic coverage in every category of information, but it is suggested that the sociological and economic sections lack the degree of objectivity which would make them particularly useful and applicable in a military situation.

h. Chapter V (Political): Most commands commented specifically on the need for up-dating political intelligence found in Chapter V of the NIS. USCINCEUR found this Chapter "particularly outdated," and pointed out the need for current supplementary sections or changes on a continuing basis. CINCUSAFE's comment was: "Because of perennial turbulence in the Middle East and the repidity with which governmental changes have occurred, this Chapter was the least useful. Recommend this Chapter be up-dated whenever major governmental changes occur, as in Iraq and the union of Egypt and Syria." In much the same vein FLEINTCENELM pointed out that "Sections of this Chapter lose a disproportionate amount of their value when over five years old."

i. Chapter VI (Economic): Paralleling the situation for Chapter V, the Sections of Chapter VI also lose a disproportionate amount of their value when over five years old, particularly in the Middle East where economic changes are more marked than in the more settled regions of the world. FLEINTCENELM found that the foreign economic relationships of LEBANON, specifically, were not adequately covered by the NIS. CINCENELM staff personnel made the same observation, noting in general that the Section covering Trade and Finance in the Middle East Chapter VI's tends to concentrate too much on financial aspects and lacks needed detail on specifics of foreign trade, including details on specific items of export and import handled by merchant shipping from the principal ports, and its origin and destination.

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j. Chapter VII (Scientific): There is not a single Section of a Chapter VII published for any of the countries in the Middle East. While the entire area is admittedly of relative minor importance in scientific fields, there is military significance, of course, attached to Section 72, Air, Ground, and Naval Weapons, particularly with the influx of Soviet arms into the UAR, YEMEN, IRAQ, and AFGHANISTAN, and great military interest in the ground, naval, and air equipment available to ISRAEL. Again, Section 71, covering Electronics, assumes increasing importance.

k. Chapter VIII (Armed Forces): US CINCEUR, CTF 62, and FLEINTCENELM, in addition to CINCELM/CINCSPECOMME, found this Chapter particularly outdated and in need of current supplementary sections or changes on a continuing basis. Amplifying discussion of the situation on Section 82, Naval Forces, was provided by FLEINTCENELM as follows:

In relatively static areas, i.e., Naval Organization, Command Structure, Administration, Policy and Doctrine, and Training and Personnel, NIS treatment was adequate. In few of these areas did this command hold publications which disputed, verified, or up-dated the material contained in the NIS. NIS could not be, and were not, relied upon for reports of current naval strength and disposition. Supplementary intelligence was required for the latter information. The date of publication of Section 82, EGYPT (February 1954), did not, of course, permit inclusion of any material on the transfer of quantities of Soviet Bloc naval material to EGYPT or reflect the influence of Soviet advisors and technicians on the capabilities of the Egyptian Navy. An up-dated supplement to this section would have been of considerable value. The preceding remarks are applicable to the other Sections of Chapter VIII.

In the specific case of Naval Forces, since ONI publishes a quarterly up-dated naval order of battle, the information is certainly available for periodic revision of the NIS Section.

l. Chapter IX (Map and Chart Appraisal): This is a vital Chapter for military planners. It is generally the very first item consulted when planning begins, for the first thing planners demand from intelligence is detailed, accurate, current maps of the areas of projected operations. Some method is needed for integrating information available from the semi-annual status reports of the Army Map Service into periodic changes or supplements to the Chapter IX information in the NIS. During the operations in Lebanon the CINCSPECOMME staff was simultaneously engaged in the development of plans for contingencies in IRAN, IRAQ, and SUDAN. The Chapter IX's of the NIS for these three countries were published in 1950, 1951, and 1950, respectively. Intelligence on the availability of current up-to-date maps that is 7 or 8 years old already is not adequate for military planning purposes.

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m. Supplement I (Ports and Naval Facilities): This information, of vital concern to both operational and logistical planning personnel of both the Navy and the Army, loses a disproportionate amount of value when more than five years old. Except for the Port Plans, FLEINTCENELM notes that the NIS on the Middle Eastern countries which were published prior to 1955 are of limited utility. CINCUSAREUR also notes that the Supplement I's are particularly obsolescent. FLEINTCENELM adds amplifying comment as follows:

NIS 28, SYRIA and LEBANON, dated 1948, is an example of basically good NIS material, the value of which has been greatly lessened because of the fact that the information is more than 10 years old. NIS on seven of nine Middle Eastern countries are over seven years old; NIS 36, PAKISTAN, does not contain Port Plans of the ports described.

n. Supplement II (Coast and Landing Beaches): For the entire SPECOMME area only one Supplement II has been published, that one being for EGYPT, and it was published in 1948, so that the information is subject to immediate challenge and negligible use in amphibious planning. (Further related comment is contained in sub-paragraph 5.b. above on Section 22.)

o. Supplement III (Telecommunications): Available only for EGYPT, of all the countries in the Middle East, and that Supplement is dated 1949. (See related comments under sub-paragraph 5.f. above on Chapter III.) For areas like the Middle East, where current U. S. military plans are most frequently based upon military operations within a country which would utilize existing communications facilities, rather than seeking to destroy them or deny them to an enemy, specifics on the whole range of telecommunication facilities is of great importance.

p. Supplement IV (Urban Areas): This Supplement has not been published for any Middle East Country. The lack of the information which would be provided is highlighted by the following FLEINTCENELM comment:

A special requirement existed for information concerning the source, distribution, and control systems for the municipal water supply of the city of Beirut. Unfortunately, Supplement IV, "Urban Areas", has not yet been issued for NIS 28, and a considerable amount of effort was expended in obtaining this information on a priority basis. This particular point is presented to emphasize the fact that "Urban Areas" Supplements have not yet been issued for any of the Middle East countries. A priority should be assigned for such production.

Related comment is found in sub-paragraph 5.e. above on Section 25.

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4. Key Personalities: Lack of sufficient intelligence of a biographic nature in the NIS on the Middle East generated many adverse criticisms from military commands consulted. The fact is that the "Key Personalities" NIS publication has not been published for any country in the Middle East. (For the entire CINCMELM area of interest this publication is available on only three countries: USSR, YUGOSLAVIA, and LIBYA.) Recognition of this deficiency generated the CINCUSAFE recommendation "that priority be given to the publication of this supplement for the Middle Eastern countries. This supplement would be of immense value in predicting the direction and complexion of a newly installed government." US CINCEUR spelled out the need for both current supplementary sections or changes plus an annual supplement to include short biographical sketches on new personalities. "For the Middle East countries," said FLEINTCINELM, "present NIS treatment is obsolescent or incomplete on military and political personalities who are not among the leaders of government or opposition forces, but who are of potential significance. Biographic data on both rebel and government personalities in LEBANON were not adequately covered by the NIS." CINCMELM/CINCSPCOMME concurs with all of these comments and re-emphasizes the need for early production and annual revision of the "Key Personalities" publication for each Middle East country.

6. Summary and Recommendations: Obviously the NIS will never answer all the requirements for any military planner; equally obviously it is not intended to, since it comprises basic intelligence which must always be supplemented with current operational intelligence. Yet improvement in the present situation, the major inadequacies of which have been discussed above, seems attainable, particularly since the military needs can be met within the military contributions to the coordinated program. The following recommendations and suggestions are offered for investigation by the NIS Committee:

a. Adaptation to a loose-leaf format to permit more flexibility of corrections, changes, and insertions of supplementary data.

b. Shift of emphasis from revision of entire Sections or Chapters to more frequent revisions of those which change most rapidly.

c. Institution of more frequent consumer testing within the military commands to keep production effort keyed closely to requirements.

d. Tap the resources within OCI in CIA which are now able to maintain the OCI Country Handbooks with more satisfying results than now achieved for similar information in the NIS.

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e. Conduct a management review of the editorial and mechanical processing that now appears to require excessive time between compilation and finished distribution.

f. Delegation to the military services of authority to prepare and issue changes to Sections under their cognizance without additional editorial steps.

g. Investigate possibility of adapting certain ACSI DeptAr, ACSI HqUSAF, and ONI finished publications for NIS use. That is, it might be possible, for example, to assign an NIS designation within Section 82 to the ONI publication 30-SD, if it were redesigned somewhat, so that separate distribution of the ONI publication could be eliminated. Data promulgated to all NIS holders would gain materially in currency in this subject, the manpower now required to do two separate editing jobs would be reduced, publication and distribution expenses would be cut, and users would consult one publication instead of two.

h. A more positive determination of the relative priorities between revision work and original production, based upon areas of importance in military planning in the immediate future, with provision for review of priorities at least annually.

i. Early production of Chapter I Briefs for ISRAEL, the ARABIAN PENINSULA, and SUDAN, and annual revisions or changes to all Chapter I's for the Middle East.

j. Priority production of Key Personalities supplements for all Middle East countries.

7. While the original request for the data compiled herein came from the Chief of Naval Operations, and CNO's announced intention is to present the comments received to the NIS Committee, this survey is deemed to be of interest on a joint basis, and a copy of this letter is accordingly being provided to the JCS and to the ACSI, Department of the Army, and the ACSI, Headquarters, USAF, in addition to the commands who contributed to the preparation of this summary.

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CTF 61

CTF 62


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